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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT c0uN'r-Y OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of HARVEY MARCELIN, 86-A-7063, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
ANDREA W. EVANS, CHAIRPERSON, NYS DIVISION OF 
PAROLE, ET. AL. 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-10-ST1338 Index No. 1408-10 
Appearances : Harvey Marcelin 
Inmate No. 86-A-7063 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Gouverneur Correctional Facility 
112 Scotch Settlement Road 
P.O. Box 370 
Gouverneur, New York 13642-0370 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
' I  he Lapitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Cathy Y. Sheehan, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Gouverneur Correctional Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated June 17, 
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2010 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving a term of 
life imprisonment under a sentence imposed for a murder he committed in 1963. The 
petitioner was paroled for that crime in 1984, but was arrested in 1986 and charged with 
manslaughter in the first degree. As the result of a plea bargain in connection with the latter 
charge, the petitioner was sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment of six to twelve 
years. 
Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the 
Parole Board failed to consider all of the factors set forth in Executive Law (5 259-i in 
denying him parole. The petitioner asserts that he has already served his sentence, and the 
Parole Board is denying him the benefit of a negotiated plea bargain agreed to in 1986. The 
petitioner maintains that the use of teleconferencing equipment to enable him to participate 
in the parole interview (as opposed to an in-person appearance before the Parole 
Commissioners) violated his due process and equal protection rights. Petitioner contends that 
the he has been prejudiced by the board’s inability to issue a timely decision of his 
administrative appeal. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“Parole is denied for the following reasons: After a careful 
review of your record and this interview, it is the determination 
of thih pawl that, if relcmed at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and your release at this time is incompatible 
with the welfare and safety of the community. This decision is 
based on the following factors: The heinous. brutal nature of the 
instant offense of manslaughter first involved you stabbing the 
female victim, causing: her demise, while ov parole s11yen4sinn 
for a murder one conviction, causing the death of another female 
victim. Your actions displayed a propensity for extreme 
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violence and a depraved indifference for human life. Note is 
made of your positive programming and improved disciplinary 
record. However, to release you at this time would deprecate 
the severity of your criminal behavior. Your actions were out of 
control and without regard for the health and safety of others, 
also demonstrating a disregard for community supervision and 
the law. Therefore, discretionary release is inappropriate at this 
time.” 
The Court notes that because there was no formal hearing in this instance, the standard 
of review is not whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence, but rather 
whether the determination is in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, 
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Pel1 v Bd. 
of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 [ 19741). 
As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (1) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
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requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; Matter of Cotlado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
200 13). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, 
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 
supra). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York Slate Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming and academic accomplishments, his 
disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to 
inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements 
ofExecutive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead 
v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of 
Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required. that the Parole 
Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of 
Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter 
of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, sunra; Matter of Dudley v 
Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter 
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of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 
556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight 
to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly 
discuss each one (see Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD 3d 168 1 [3rd 
Dept., 20101; Matter of Wise v New York StaKDivision of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 
20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first 
sentence of Executive Law tj 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 
859 [3‘d Dept., 20061). “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give 
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for 
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the 
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations 
In other words, 
omitted). 
Petitioner’s claim that he has already served his negotiated plea sentence is incorrect. 
Petitioner’s parole violation and the plea that came from it did not abrogate his prior life 
sentence (see People v Curlev, 285 AD2d 274 [4th Dept., 20011). Rather, his maximum 
twelve year sentence from the manslaughter plea was added to his maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, making his maximum prison term still life imprisonment (see Penal $ 70.30 
[ 1 J [b]; and former Penal Law 6 70.30, as that section read at the time of petitioner’s 
sentencing; Matter of Brown v Annucci, 60 AD3d 1223, 1224 [3rd Dept., 20091). 
5 
[* 5]
Petitioner’s assertion that he was deprived of his due process and equal protection 
rights by reason that he appeared at the parole interview by teleconference rather than in 
person is equally without merit (Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614 [3rd Dept., 20063; 
Matter of Mack v Travis, 283 AD2d 700 [3rd Dept., 20011, Iv dismissed 96 NY2d 896 
[2001]; Matter of Vanier v Travis, 274 AD2d 797 [3rd Dept., 20001). 
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely 
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying 
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her 
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial 
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR 5 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York 
State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People 
ex rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rd Dept., 20001; Matter of Mentor v New York State 
Division of Parole, 67 A.D.3d 1 108 [3rd Dept., 20091). 
Lastly, the petitioner objects to Commissioner Hernandez’ characterization of him 
during the parole interview as a “grown-ass man”. The remark was made after the petitioner, 
who was 47 years old at the time he committed his second homicide, attributed it to “youth 
and poor judgment and stupidity”. While other words might otherwise have been chosen to 
convey the same thought, the Court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated that 
Commissioner Hernandez or the Parole Commissioners wew biased, or that the 
determination flowed from any such bias. 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
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lawhl procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relatin? to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 




September /L ,2O 10 
Troy, New York Supreme Court Justice 





Order To Show Cause dated March 1 1,20 10, Petition, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated May 1 1,20 10, Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
Petitioner’s Affirmation in Reply To Respondent‘s Answer, dated May 17, 
2010. 
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